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Abstract—We present a memristive device based R3PUF con-
struction achieving highly desired PUF properties, which are not
offered by most current PUF designs: (1) High reliability, almost
100% that is crucial for PUF-based cryptographic key genera-
tions, significantly reducing, or even eliminating the expensive
overhead of on-chip error correction logic and the associated
helper on-chip data storage or off-chip storage and transfer. (2)
Reconfigurability, while current PUF designs rarely exhibit such
an attractive property. We validate our R3PUF via extensive
Monte-Carlo simulations in Cadence based on parameters of real
devices. The R3PUF is simple, cost-effective and easy to manage
compared to other PUF constructions exhibiting high reliability
or reconfigurability. None of previous PUF constructions is able
to provide both desired high reliability and reconfigurability
concurrently.
Index Terms—Reconfigurable PUF; High reliable; Memristive
devices
I. INTRODUCTION
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit the static
randomness resulting from uncontrollable process variations
to extract instance-specific secrets. Unlike assigned storage
digital secrets in a memory, the instance-specific secrets arise
during the creation of PUF embedding devices. Attribut-
ing to inevitable randomness, PUFs cannot be reproducibly
forged even by the original manufacturer. Various physical
randomness sources have been utilized for building PUFs
such as gate-delay [20], [15], power-on state of the static
random-access memory (SRAM) [8]. Among memory-based
PUFs, SRAM PUFs gained the most attention since they are
considered ’for free‘ due to memory availability in almost all
commodity products. As the conventional silicon technology is
continuously scaling down and approaching its most material
and physical extents, there is a growing urge to look for
memory elements for nanoelectronic applications.
The memristive device is one of promising candidates con-
sidering its faster speed, higher density, lower power and non-
volatility. Moreover, its fabrication is compatible with current
CMOS fabrication process. However, in nano region, currently,
they suffer serious variations that somehow deteriorates their
performance in memory applications. As the device engineers
are always attempting to eliminate the variations. Security
applications, for example, PUF constructions based on the
memristive devices [18], [12], [19], [17], [14], [6], [5], actually
embrace such prevalent physical variations, because truly
prevalent randomness implies more entropy when extracting
PUF secrets.
The response (output) given the same PUF is highly desired
to be stable when it is re-evaluated upon the same challenge
(input). This property is referred to as reliability. Besides that,
there are other desirable properties such as reconfigurability
and large challenge response pairs (CRPs) space—more en-
tropy extracted within a compact area. Reconfigurability of a
PUF is the capability of refreshing its CRPs—evolving the
PUF itself into a new instance that exhibits different CRP
behaviors, which is of great importance in many application
scenarios such as updating electronic tokens—electronic tick-
ets, and preventing downgrading software versions by binding
software to hardware [13], [10], [7]. As the other intermediate
benefit, the derived key from an rPUF can also be renovated
whenever necessary. Moreover, it is indicated that the rPUF
is capable of eliminating some potential attacks such as mod-
eling attacks and reverse engineering [16]. We also note that
the reconfigurability helps to mitigate security concerns that
malicious contract manufacturers evaluate PUF secrets without
authorization before PUF enrollment by a trusted party. In this
context, the PUF secrets can be reconfigured before enrollment
phase by the trust party, where the reconfigurability makes
PUF secrets evaluated by malicious manufactures useless.
Motivated by these targets, we present a memory-based
PUF construction, a highly Reliable memRistive element
based Reconfigurable PUF (R3PUF), termed as R3PUF by
leveraging peculiarities of memristive devices. Compared with
memory PUFs based on CMOS, eg., SRAM, R3PUF has
higher density that enables a large CRP space within a compact
area attributing to the small footprint of memristive devices.
Most significantly, R3PUF achieves both high reliability and
reconfigurability, while most of current memory-based PUF
constructions may achieve either one of them, but not both, at
the cost of expensive additional logic. The main contributions
of this work are summarized as follows:
Highly reliable PUF. We develop R3PUF to generate highly
reliable responses. As a consequence, error correction logic is
less or even no more required resulting in a lightweight alterna-
tive that can be easily plugged into PUF based key generation
applications. Based on our simulation results in Section IV-C,
R3PUF achieves reliability of 100%.
Reconfigurable PUF. We endow R3PUF with reconfigura-
bility without incurring additional area overhead, so that its
CRP(s) can be refreshed whenever necessary at no additional
costs. We emphasize that the reconfiguration of R3PUF is
unpredictable and irreversible.
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Fig. 1. (a) RESET and SET operation of the memristive device. (b)
Experimental resistance variation distribution on LRS and HRS state—
corresponding to RON and ROFF respectively—measured from 1600 mem-
ristive devices [11].
Evaluation. We validate R3PUF performance using a pub-
lic memristive device model guided with experimental data.
We detail the rationale of improved R3PUF performance
in comparison with previous memristive device based-PUF
constructions [18], [12], [19], [17], [14], [6], [5].
In next section, we present a background on memris-
tive devices and their propoerties, followed by concisely
survey of one memristive device based reliable PUF and
two reconfigurable PUF constructions. We also introduce the
important memristive device property unnoticed in previous
PUF designs. In Section III we outline R3PUF design along
with its operations. Section IV evaluates R3PUF performance
and compares it with other memristive device based PUFs.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. MEMRISTIVE DEVICES BASED PUFS
A. Resistance Variation Sources
A memristive device is a two terminal non-volatile nano
element. It switches between high resistance state (HRS) and
low resistance state (LRS) by applying a negative/positive
potential difference between the top electrode and bottom
electrode. The growth and disruption of filamentary conductive
paths inside the insulating dielectric are responsible for this
switching behavior, illustrated in Fig. 1 (a). The switching
from HRS to LRS is referred to as the SET operation, whereas
the switching from LRS to HRS is referred to as the RESET
operation. The HRS and LRS that are also changeably referred
to as ROFF and RON respectively to denote the two logic
states for storing digital information. Attributing to its non-
volatility, stored information (resistance) remains after power
being cut-off.
The memristive device has a very small footprint. A special
layer partially doped is sandwiched between two electrodes.
The thickness is down to several nanometers. This enables
super high content information storage capability in a compact
area where memristive devices are integrated [21]. However,
for memristive devices, resistance variations is inevitable and
actually prevalent due to the hardness of fine fabrication
control [21]. Geometrical variations such as thickness, width,
dopant density significantly impact the resistance in both HRS
and LRS states, which has been experimentally measured in
fabricated devices, see Fig. 1 (b). This is obviously unwanted
for memory-based applications because resistance variations
deteriorate read margin when distinguishing between HRS and
LRS states. However, this prevalent true randomness is of
importance for PUF designs [18], [12], [19], [1], [2], [17],
[14], [6], [5], [3].
Besides the geometric induced variations, the resistance in
HRS and LRS is also determined by cycle-to-cycle (C2C)
variation. C2C variation is an unique variation that is not
exhibited by CMOS devices. It is caused by random locations
of filaments in the memristive device when it is reprogrammed
cycle by cycle—some of these metal filaments’ locations are
formed and disrupted randomly during reprogramming [23],
[22], [2]. Hence, the resistance observed in HRS or LRS
states varies not only among devices but also among different
programing cycles given the same device. The C2C variation
adopted from measured data is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Cycle-to-cycle (C2C) variations. ROFF/HRS and RON/LRS variation
of an individual memristive device for 1000 cycles, experimental data is
adopted from [22].
B. Reliable PUFs and Reconfigurable PUFs
1) A Reliable PUF: Che et al. [1] proposed a memristive
device based PUF that generates highly reliable (error free)
response. The PUF operations during enrollment are general-
ized in Fig. 3 and follow steps as: i) All of memristive devices
in an array are initially programmed into LRS. This indicates
the entropy of PUF response is from the resistance variance
in RON, see Fig. 1 (b). ii) The varied RON resistance of each
memristive device is digitalized. Then the the median of all
digitalized values is determined. iii) The memristive device
is programmed into LRS if the digitalized value of such a
specific device is lower than the median value, otherwise the
memristive device is programmed into HRS.
In general, in Fig.3, if the memristive device initial re-
sistance is lower than the median of LRS (RON), its final
state is LRS state. Otherwise, its final state is in HRS state.
The regeneration of PUF response is simply reading out the
median of
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R
OFF
R
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Fig. 3. Generalized operations of the memristive device based high reliable
PUF in [1].
memristive device’s state, HRS/LRS is eg., ‘1’/’0’. The ratio
of HRS to LRS is large enough to distinguish these two states,
see Fig. 1 (b), in other words, there is no overlap because of a
large gap between bimodal resistance distributions. Thereupon,
the reliable response regeneration is ensured.
Although this PUF capture certain desirable features from
memristive devices such as substantial resistance variations in
either HRS or LRS, high resistance ratio of HRS to LRS and
non-volatility. The operation procedures during the enrollment
is, however, complicated. Such a complicated enrollment phase
results in higher cost due to the usage of analog-to-digital
converter, counter, and also write-back circuits. As will be
shown in the R3PUF, we require neither any extra hardware
nor the write-back operation.
2) Reconfigurable PUFs: Gao et al. [5] and Chen et al.[2]
noticed that unique C2C variations of memristive offers the
feasibility to design rPUFs. In general, these two memristive
device based rPUF constructions exploit either HRS or LRS
resistance distributions as random source to extract responses.
The response is produced based on comparisons of two (or
more) memristive devices’ resistance when they are aligned
to the same state (HRS/LRS). The response readout uses a
small voltage without disturbing the resistance of memristive
devices. Whenever reconfiguration is on demand, memristive
devices are reprogrammed using a larger voltage that is able
to SET/REST the devices.
C. Abrupt Switching Behavior
The abrupt switching behavior reacts with the threshold
voltage phenomena [23]—illustrated in Fig. 4. For electric-
field-induced bipolar switching in a memristive device, the
applied electric field plays a dominant role. A small electric-
field is inadequate to move ions in the device to change its
resistance [23]. Therefore, in practice, the resistance of the
memristive device stays unchanged or changes negligibly if the
voltage drops across the memristive device falling within two
threshold voltages VRESET and VSET. Otherwise, it swiftly
switches to HRS if the biased voltage reaches to VRESET or
to LRS if the biased voltage goes to VSET.
By exploiting C2C variations and abrupt switching behavior
of memristive devices, our R3PUF achieves high reliability and
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Fig. 4. Typical I-V (current-voltage) curve (a) and the corresponding Ω-V
curve (b) of a bipolar memristive device. Both plotted in linear scale,
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Fig. 5. (a) Basic R3PUF cells are placed as an array on chips, alike to
memory-based PUFs, address of the R3PUF cell is the challenge. (b) Basic
R3PUF cell circuit. Two memristive devices are serially connected. The
inverter acts as a voltage comparator to produce a digitalized response.
reconfigurability concurrently with a very simple design and
operations.
III. R3PUF DESIGN
In this Section, we detail the principles of R3PUF design
by making most of all forgoing memristive device properties.
A. R3PUF construction
Topology of the R3 PUF is similar to popular memory-based
PUFs [8], [24]. A memory-based PUF consists of a number
of memory cells, each cell produces a response bit that is
independent on others generated by other cells. The R3PUF,
as illustrated in Fig. 5 (b), has an alike topology, where the
challenge is the address of the R3PUF cell in a high density
array. The R3PUF cell is quite simple, where two memristive
devices M1, M2 are connected serially. Its operation has two
phases: response extraction and readout.
1) Response Extraction.: Both memristive devices are set to
LRS/RON initially—also see visualized operation procedures
depicted in Fig. 6. Then the applied voltage Vin across
two devices gradually increases to 2 × |VRESET|—noting
the polarity of memristive device. Due to inherent resistance
variations, RON1 (LRS resistance of M1) and RON2 are
different. For the purpose of easing the description, we assume
that RON1 > RON2. As a consequence, M1 will first reach to
the RESET threshold voltage VRESET and start switching to
the ROFF1. This is because M1 shares more applied voltage
considering the fact that M1 and M2 eventually forms a voltage
divider. Once M1 starts switching to ROFF1, its increasingly
shared voltage further amplifies its switching and makes it
switching to ROFF1 even faster. At the meantime, M2 is stuck
set ,M2M1 to
LRS initially
gradually increase Vin
approach to 2xVRESET
M1/M2 abruptly swithes to HRS
the other stays in LRS
response readout
with applying small Vin
LRS
LRS
assume
RON1 RON2>
M1
M2
response
logic `1'
( 1 )
( 2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
| |
LRS
LRS
HRSM1
M2
Fig. 6. R3 PUF operation procedures, it requires no extra hardware.
in RON2 because it cannot reach to its threshold voltage as the
fact that the voltage dropped across it becomes even smaller
once M1 starts switching. In our R3PUF construction, this
amplification alike voltage sharing behavior eventually serves
as one basis of the high reliability.
2) Response Readout.: The readout is performed by simply
applying a small voltage that not disturbs resistance of mem-
ristive devices. Recall that at the end of response extraction
phase, the M1 is in ROFF1 and the M2 is in RON2. According
to
Vout = Vin × RON2
RON2 +ROFF1
(1)
and ROFF/RON is usually large—1000 has been experimen-
tally shown in [11]. We can see that the Vout will close to
0 V. We further digitize Vout to obtain a response by simply
utilizing an inverter—acting as a voltage comparator. Hence,
the response of ‘1’ is produced in this exemplary case.
Considering M1 remains in HRS and M2 in LRS even
when the power is off, therefore, whenever the response is
regenerated later, it will be stably reproduced. To sum it up,
the exploitation of non-volatility of memristive device and high
ratio of HRS to LRS enables robust response regeneration.
B. R3PUF Reconfiguration
To endow the R3PUF with reconfigurability, firstly, the
M1 is reprogrammed back to R′ON1 from ROFF1—we follow
the same motivating example in Section III-A—by applying
Vin that is smaller than −VSET, again noting the polarity of
memristive devices in Fig. 5. Now taking the C2C variation
into consideration, the R′ON1 of M1 after this SET operation
is different from the previous value. As a result, the rela-
tionship between R′ON1 and RON2 becomes unknown—which
one is higher is nondeterministic. Next, response extraction
operations, step 2 to step 3 depicted in Fig. 6, are conducted
to extract a refreshed response, where the response value is
unpredictable.
We realize that the number of times that R3PUFs can be
reconfigured is determined by the endurance of memristive
devices. Endurance is the maximum cycles that the memristive
device can be reprogrammed between HRS and LRS without
suffering obvious read margin degradation. Specifically, the
ratio of HRS/LRS still keeps higher enough to explicitly
distinguish two logic states: ‘0’ and ‘1’. Luckily, the endurance
TABLE I
PARAMETER SETTINGS
Parameter Mean Std Distribution Type
RON 5× 105Ω 5% Lognormal
ROFF 5× 108Ω 5% Lognormal
VRESET −1 V 5% Gaussian
VSET 1 V 5% Gaussian
transistor length 120 nm 5% Gaussian
transistor width 90 nm 5% Gaussian
usually is high, for example, experimental reports of 105 in [9].
This number is adequate for most rPUF applications.
IV. R3PUF EVALUATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
We evaluate and analyze the R3 PUF performance based
on the below described public behavior model guided with
experimental data as shown in Fig. 1 [11]. Then we fairly
compare it with other memristive device based PUFs.
A. Memristive Device Model and Simulation Setup
1) Device Model: The memristive device model is adopted
from [4]. It has a state variable ω ⊂ [0, 1] corresponding to
the value of its resistance Rm, which is a function as
Rm = ROFF(RON/ROFF)
ω (2)
According to Eq. 2, Rm = ROFF when ω = 0, while Rm is
in the RON state if ω = 1.
The dynamic switching behavior of the memristive device
is defined as:
dw
dt
=
 α(v − VSET), (v ≥ VSET)α(v + VRESET), (v ≤ VRESET)
βv, otherwise,
(3)
where v is the voltage drop through the memristive device. Al-
thoug we consider a symmetrical threshold voltage for VRESET
and VSET, it will not affect the performance evaluation. The
α and β coefficients are switching rates. Here, we set β = 0
assuming that the smaller voltage does not alter the state
variable as pointed out in [23]. The α = 105 to fit the
experimentally reported abruptly switching when v > VSET
or v < VRESET.
The developed behavioral model created in Verilog-A lan-
guage is also adopted from [4]. Simulated I-V curve in Fig. 7
(a) shows well matching behavior as in Fig. 4.
2) Simulation Setup: The memristive device model is in-
tegrated into the R3PUF cell circuit as shown in Fig. 5,
the inverter is implemented by standard 90nm technology.
The simulation is conducted via Monte Carlo command in
Cadence. Variations for different parameters are listed in
Table I. Note the variance of RON and ROFF is intentionally
set smaller than the measured data in Fig. 2 in order to
demonstrate that slightly variation is already able to lead a
high reliable R3PUF.
B. Results
We carry out simulations according to the R3PUF operations
depicted in Fig. 6. The R3PUF operation is simple that only
involves with controlling the applied voltage Vin. Therefore,
we depict the setting of Vin and the corresponding output
voltage Vout between M1 and M2 in Fig. 7 to experimentally
imply the entire operation procedures by an indirectly means.
We first describe a specific validation of a single R3PUF cell
before large population evaluations. The M1 and M2 are set
to be LRS state initially, where RON1 = 5 × 105 Ω and
RON2 = 4.99× 105 Ω with a very small resistance difference
of 0.2% compared with RON1.
Starts from shadowed area a in Fig. 7 (b), Vin is gradually
increased from 0 V to 2.5 V. Both of M1 and M2 stay
unchanged as Vin << 2 V considering that Vout is linear
increased as Vin increases. Once the voltage approaches to
2 V = 2× |VRESET|, the M1 starts switching first as it shares
a larger voltage—recall RON1 > RON2, hence, it reaches to
RESET threshold first. The resistance of M1 switches from
RON1 to ROFF1 that is amplified by the abrupt switching
behavior as the voltage dropped across M1 becomes larger.
Such a switching will be quickly finished, and later almost
all applied voltage drops across M1 according to Equation (1)
and a large HRS/LRS ratio, thereupon, the Vout goes down to
near 0 V. The response readout is validated by applying a Vin
of 1 V as shown in area b of Fig. 7. As the Vout ≈ 0 V, the
response gives logic ‘1’ after digitalization by an inverter.
Monte Carlo simulation runs 15,000 times taking all the
variation sources in Table I into consideration. In other words,
15,000 R3PUF cells are simulated. Histograms of Vout and
response are shown in Fig. 7 (c). We can see that the Vout is
either close to 0 V or 1 V when the readout voltage Vin =
1 V is applied. The percentage of ‘1’ in response is 50.60%,
which is close to the ideal value of 50% that implies good
randomness/unpredictability.
C. Discussions
1) Reliability: Due to the unavailable memristive device
temperature model [5], [19], the reliability performance under
different temperatures cannot be evaluated. However, the high
reliability can be envisioned because of the rationale: i) Once
the step 3 of R3PUF operation is done, the resistance of M1
and M2 will remain constantly even the power is off attributing
to the non-volatility. ii) Vout demonstrated in Fig. 7 (c) shows
a widely and clearly separation indicating that there is always
one memristive device is in LRS state and the other one is
in the opposite HRS state. iii) Seeing the high ratio of ROFF
to RON, even right tail of RON distribution and left tail of
ROFF distribution still has magnitude difference. Foregoing
facts guarantee that the later re-readout of response is robust.
Actually, the histogram of Vout from 15,000 R3PUF cells
implies a reliability of 100%.
2) Reconfigurability: To reconfigure the R3PUF, SET both
of M1 and M2 to LRS is needed. This is validated in the area
c in Fig. 7 (b). After SET operation, both memristive devices
are in LRS. Considering the physical means induced C2C
variations, the response generated once the R3PUF is recon-
figured cannot be predicted even the previous response value
is known. This guarantees the forward security. Likewise,
observing the later generated response after reconfiguration is
unable to discover the previous response value, which ensures
the backward security. Further, the reconfiguration by using
C2C variation cannot be reversed by any party.
3) Comparisons: The results of R3PUF are from sim-
ulations, note other memristive device based PUF realiza-
tions [18], [12], [19], [1], [2], [17], [14], [6], [5] also evaluated
from simulations. Therefore, it is reasonable to compare with
them.
We are the first work to achieve both high reliability
and reconfigurability, moreover, without extra area cost and
complicated operations. These works [18], [12], [19], [17]
do not take the inherent C2C variations into consideration,
which may further degrade these PUF designs’ reliability
performance. Two works consider the C2C variations to design
rPUFs [2], [5] but without realizing high reliability. Given
the only work shows high reliability [1] reviewed in Sec-
tion II, it requires complex operation procedures and costs
extra hardware overhead. All the aforementioned designs do
not fully take advantage of the properties exhibited by the
memristive devices, which maybe the reason that they cannot
offer high reliability and reconfigurability simultaneously with
a very simple circuit implementation. The R3PUF exploits
more inherent properties from the memristive devices: process
variations, C2C variations, abrupt dynamic switching behavior,
high ratio ROFF/RON, high endurance and the non-volatility.
All of these exploited properties of memristive devices even-
tually lead to a simple R3PUF but equipped with better
performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the R3PUF design and evaluate
its performance by extensive simulations guided with existed
memristive device model and parameters from experimental
data. The R3PUF has higher reliability performance and also
is reconfigurable without extra area cost and complicated
operations, because we are able to capture peculiarities of
memristive devices. Based on the simulation, it indicates that
the reliability is almost to 100%, if not 100% as infinitely
Monte Carlo runs cannot be achieved. Therefore, the ECC
implementation overhead can be significantly reduced—or
maybe omitted based on the error free response shown in
the results—when the R3PUF is used for cryptographic key
generations. In addition, The unique C2C variation is exploited
to reconfigure the CRPs of the R3PUF, which enables updating
the derived cryptographic keys on demand.
Our future work will experimentally evaluate R3PUF’s
performance based on fabricated memristive devices.
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